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THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDIS-
COVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY. By Charles M. Haar and Daniel 
W. Fessler. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1986. Pp. 336. $18.95. 
Black citizens in Dade City, Florida, recently brought suit seeking 
to eliminate disparities in the way the municipality provides street 
paving services and water drainage facilities to black and white resi-
dential areas. 1 The problem of unequal access to essential municipal 
services - such as electricity, sewerage, and water - is pervasive, 
afflicting disadvantaged people living "on the wrong side of the 
tracks." Charles·M. Haar2 and Daniel W. Fessler3 maintain that the 
solution to this problem has been available for centuries: the ancient 
common law doctrine that all people similarly situated deserve equal 
access to adequate, reasonably priced community services. In The 
Wrong Side of the Tracks, these authors explore both the origins of the 
"duty to serve," imposed by the common law on monopolistic provid-
ers of essential community services, and the principle of equality in the 
1. See Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (M.D. Fla. 1984), ajfd., 783 F.2d 982 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
2. Charles M. Haar is Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law at Harvard University and was 
the first Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Development in the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. Haar also served as an urban affairs advisor to Presidents Johnson and 
Carter and currently heads the Land Policy Roundtable of the Lincoln Institute. 
3. Daniel W. Fessler is the William and Sally Rutter Distinguished Professor of Law, King 
Hall School of Law, University of California at Davis. He has also been a consultant to the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare on the provision of legal services to the 
disadvantaged. 
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provision of public services which animates that duty. They then de-
tail how the Anglo-American common law courts preserved that no-
tion of equality in the face of drastic social and technological change. 
Haar and Fessler conclude that state courts today can use these com-
mon law principles more effectively than modem constitutional theo-
ries for the purpose of ensuring equal access to essential public 
services.4 
The authors turned to the common law because recent Supreme 
Court equal protection analysis presents barriers to municipal services 
equalization suits brought under the fourteenth amendment. In the 
late 1960s, public-interest lawyers "were convinced that a logical ex-
tension of the successful battle to desegregate schools and public facili-
ties involved a constitutional assault upon the living conditions of 
people on the wrong side of the tracks" (p.31). Some successful equal-
ization suits have been brought under the fourteenth amendment. 5 
However, two crucial Supreme Court pronouncements preclude wide-
spread use of the equal protection clause as a weapon against munici-
pal services discrimination. First, the Court has refused to include 
classifications based on poverty in the group of suspect classifications 
triggering strict scrutiny. Second, it adopted a discriminatory intent 
requirement in Washington v. Davis, 6 eliminating claims alleging only 
discriminatory impact. While not all neighborhoods that suffer from 
inadequate municipal services are inhabited solely by racial minorities, 
the affected citizenry is usually poor. Yet because classifications based 
on poverty are not suspect, many instances of municipal services dis-
crimination will be subject only to minimal scrutiny and will easily 
survive constitutional attack (pp. 43-47). Even where the effects of the 
unequal distribution of public services fall disproportionately on mi-
norities, the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate discriminatory in-
tent in equal protection claims based on race makes the success of 
fourteenth amendment equalization claims very uncertain (p. 53). 
Discouraged by these limits on effective use of the federal Constitu-
tion, Haar and Fessler looked to the common law for an alternative 
remedial theory. 
The authors found a common law solution - the duty of equal 
and adequate service - and located its origin in the thirteenth-century 
jurisprudence of Henry de Bracton. 7 Bracton asserted that the King 
was the source of all privileges held by individuals. Once the King put 
4. "Our purpose, above all, is to provide a potent means, through traditional common law 
doctrine, of addressing major aspects of poverty and inequality in our time." P. 20. 
5. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Ammons v. Dade City, 783 
F.2d 982 {I Ith Cir. 1986). 
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
7. P. 60. Bracton was a prominent jurist who advocated greater royal authority. His theory 
is contained in De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Ang/iae (circa 1250), in which he attempted to set 
out the common law principles and customs then existing. 
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privileges such as monopoly operation of a ferry or local mill in pri-
vate hands, those privileges entailed an obligation to all of society. 
Thus, anyone in possession of such a privilege could lose it through 
abuse or nonuse. These ideas, included in legislation during the reign 
of Edward I, 8 "conveyed an express mandate to the judiciary to as-
sume both the jurisdiction and responsibility for balancing private 
right against public advantage" (p. 65). 
Judges activated this legislation when mill and bakery monopo-
lists, the holders of private privilege, brought suit for competitive in-
jury against rival operators. These monopolies were analogous to 
today's local public utilities: the seller totally dominated the market in 
providing essential community services (pp. 67-69). Courts were not 
enthusiastic about these suits and would allow them to go fonvard 
only if the monopolist could demonstrate that he had discharged his 
corresponding duties to the commonwealth. Unless the monopolist 
proved he had provided "full use (access for all)" without any "abuse 
(rendition of a service of reasonable quality and price)," his suit would 
not succeed (pp. 74-75). 
These judicial attempts to maintain equal access to essential public 
services are the basis of the "duty to serve" which Haar and Fessler 
carefully trace through the subsequent five hundred years. The au-
thors, using transportation as an example of a public service, discuss 
the application of this duty in England both to ferry monopolies of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to railroad interests of the 
nineteenth century. 
Two themes unite the narrative: society's continuing need for an evolv-
ing transportation matrix and a judicial insistence that the matrix at all 
times be afforded to all citizens on terms calculated to serve the greatest 
number at the minimum cost. The tale reveals many factual twists, but 
few ideological turns. [p. 106] 
By the late nineteenth century the "duty to serve" was firmly en-
trenched in American law and its continued vitality seemed certain. 
The authors quote an 1869 state court decision that reflects this ac-
ceptance: "The [railroads] derive their chartered right from the State. 
They owe an equal duty to each citizen .... Such is the common law on 
the subject. " 9 The authors use this historical discussion to demon-
strate that equality in the provision of public services has been an en-
during and fundamental concern of common law judges. 
Haar and Fessler's historical exposition culminates in a description 
of judicial application of the "duty to serve" to modern utilities and 
8. The legislation, enacted in 1285, was entitled "A Statute on the Form of Confirmation of 
Charters." P. 64. 
9. P. 131 (quoting New England Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 57 Me. 188, 196-97 (1869) 
(emphasis added by Haar and Fessler)). See also p. 119 (" 'The general principle of equality is 
the principle of the common law.'") (quoting McDulfee v. Portland & R.R.R., 52 N.H. 430, 456 
(1873)). 
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the municipality itself. From early in this century, courts have found 
it relatively easy to compel private gas, electric, water and sewage, and 
communications utilities to provide equal services, since these utilities 
exhibit many characteristics of entities historically subject to the com-
mon law duty: they provide essential services, they are usually mo-
nopolies, and they operate under a franchise from the state or 
municipality (p. 143). According to the authors, the "duty to serve" 
approach that has been applied in utilities regulation can be particu-
larly relevant to the problem of contemporary municipal services dis-
crimination, since the typical municipality is also a monopolistic 
provider of essential services. 
The role of common law judges in contemporary controversies 
over utility extensions and abandonments is also relevant to service 
discrimination by municipalities. As communities grow, courts re-
quire privately owned utilities to make all reasonable additions to ser-
vice within the area they were chartered to serve; an extension of 
service is reasonable so long as the utility receives an overall fair rate 
of return (pp. 175-77). A number of recent decisions apply that rule to 
publicly owned utilities. 10 Haar and Fessler favor further extension of 
this principle by judicial mandate to municipalities whose communi-
ties suffer from inequity in the distribution of public services. 
The application of these common law rules to municipal govern-
ments may conflict with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The au-
thors briefly discuss this problem but do not believe it presents a major 
obstacle to their theory (pp. 189-92). Sovereign immunity generally 
does not protect the municipality when it is providing gas, water, or 
electricity to residents. In providing these services, the government is 
acting so much like a public utility that a duty to provide equal access 
readily applies to the municipality. Although traditional sovereign 
immunity doctrine protects municipalities from liability when they en-
gage in functions that are peculiarly governmental, such as providing 
fire hydrants, street lights, and paving, 11 the authors argue that this 
distinction between types of services may now be nothing more than a 
"semantic veil" (p. 189). Because sovereign immunity "has fallen 
from judicial favor ... [and] only a retrograde and dwindling minority 
10. See Robinson v. City ofBoulder, 190 Colo. 357, 547 P.2d 228 (1976); Johnson v. Reasor, 
392 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1965); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 
667 (1952); State v. East Shores, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 57, 380 A.2d 1168 (Ch. Div. 1977), modi-
fied, 164 N.J. Super. 530, 397 A.2d 368 (App. Div. 1979). Cf. City of Greenwood v. Provine, 143 
Miss. 42, 108 So. 284 (1926) (refusal to extend services permissible only where extension unrea-
sonable under the circumstances). But see Town of Wickenburg v. Sabin, 68 Ariz. 75, 200 P.2d 
342 (1948) (extension of service is within the municipality's discretion and may not be compelled 
by the courts). Many judges remain reluctant to involve themselves so extensively in local affairs. 
Pp. 181-85. 
11. See 12 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 35.35, at 581-83 (rev. 3d ed. 
1986); 18 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§§ 53.22-53.59, at 242-378 (rev. 3d ed. 
1984). 
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of jurisdictions retain it" (p. 190), the authors conclude that the doc-
trine is no longer a barrier to relief. 
Haar and Fessler identify several advantages in using the common 
law duty of equal and adequate service to attack municipal services 
discrimination. First, although equalization suits have broad political 
consequences and ideally should be decided under principles embodied 
in our basic political document, the Constitution, the common law 
duty of equal service is the product of centuries of reasoned political 
and legal reflection. Moreover, the continued vitality of much of the 
venerable common law is part of our constitutional framework. Sec-
ond, action through state common law courts is more desirable than 
resort to federal judicial decree, because it allows local and state gov-
ernments to solve their own problems creatively rather than subjecting 
them to the stifling uniformity of federal commands. Finally, the com-
mon law doctrine provides broader relief than is available through 
constitutional adjudication, because it does not require proof of inten-
tional racial discrimination. The problem of unequal municipal serv-
ices afflicts the poor of all races. Thus, "[t]he common law doctrine, 
paying no heed to origin or color, has a greater sweep for relief once 
the inequality of treatment is proven" (p. 233). 
The Wrong Side of the Tracks advocates an innovative and useful 
approach to municipal services discrimination. 12 Subjecting munici-
palities that are monopolistic providers of essential community serv-
ices to the common law duties of equal access provides an effective 
legal means for attacking municipal services discrimination. Further, 
this book effectively and carefully documents the legal history in this 
field. The authors' historical survey highlights the richness and con-
tinued relevance of the common law tradition by illustrating how the 
fundamental notion of equal access to essential services has endured 
through seven centuries of Anglo-American law. These common law 
principles, refined over the centuries, constitute a humanistic social 
doctrine that has retained its central meaning and moral vision while 
adapting to various political and technological changes (p. 19). 
Yet one wishes the authors would have devoted more attention to 
serious problems that could arise if courts apply common law duties to 
force expansion of municipal services. The authors recognize and dis-
cuss only briefly the potential for tension between the courts and the 
more political executive and legislative branches over sensitive issues 
12. Elsewhere these authors have approached the municipal services discrimination problem 
in a more conventional manner. See Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: 
Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441 (1971) (dis-
cussing procedural and evidentiary aspects of fourteenth amendment equalization suits in the 
wake of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw). See also Rossum, The Rise and Fall of Equalization Litiga-
tion, 7 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. S8 (1980); Note, Title VL· The Impact/Intent Debate Enters the 
Municipal Services Arena, SS ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124 (1980) (discussing an equalization suit 
alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VI). 
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of resource scarcity and allocation (pp. 239-45). Use of this common 
law strategy may draw courts into areas of fiscal and administrative 
policy making where society does not want them to operate. For ex-
ample, cities reluctant to raise taxes may be forced to decide which 
worthy program to cut in order to finance a court-ordered expansion 
of some other service. Such a dilemma could require a painful reor-
dering of priorities by local officials and their constituents. While 
troublesome questions regarding the potential consequences of the au-
thors' proposals remain unanswered, Haar and Fessler should be com-
mended for injecting fresh meaning into the ancient common law 
"duty to serve." 
- Gregory A. Kalscheur 
